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INTRODUCTION
This dispute arises from San Juan County’s decision not to revoke the conditional
use permit it issued for a wind power project owned by Latigo Wind Project, LLC, which
is in turn owned by Sustainable Power Group, LLC (“sPower,” pronounced ess-power)
northwest of Monticello, Utah, known as the Latigo Wind Farm.
Members of Northern Monticello Alliance, LLC (“NMA”) own property adjacent
to the wind farm. Their property is zoned for agricultural use and is undeveloped, save for
a well on one parcel for which the drilling permit has expired. Besides the well, none of
NMA’s members has applied for any sort of development permit, although they contend
they intend to eventually build homes on their parcels.
The wind farm was initially developed by Wasatch Wind Intermountain, LLC
(“Wasatch Wind”), which applied for and received a conditional use permit from San Juan
County in July 2012. The county planning commission issued Wasatch Wind an amended
permit at a hearing later that year in October. The amended permit was conditioned on
Wasatch Wind including as much flicker (the shadows created by turning blades), light,
and sound mitigation as possible, and putting any new land purchase or lease deals it
entered into with contiguous landowners in writing. During the October 2012 hearing,
Wasatch Wind’s representatives made several representations about what the company
would do to mitigate the project’s impact, including taking steps to mitigate ice throw (a
rare event that could occur when ice that had built up on a blade was thrown off, but is
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largely avoided with sensors and monitoring) and offering either to buy the NMA
members’ properties or make financial mitigation payments to them. None of Wasatch
Wind’s representations beyond the flicker, light, and sound mitigation, however, were
made permit conditions by the planning commission.
NMA appealed the grant of the permit, but withdrew its challenge upon entering
into an option agreement with Wasatch Wind in February 2013, whereby Wasatch Wind
agreed to immediately pay NMA members $1,250 an acre in exchange for withdrawing the
appeal and a two-year option to purchase the NMA property for $10,000 an acre, which
had to be exercised (unless it first terminated the agreement) when Wasatch Wind began
“significant construction activities” on the wind park.
The two years passed, however, without Wasatch Wind beginning physical
construction on the project or exercising the option. Wasatch Wind then sold Latigo Wind
Park, LLC, with its conditional use permit, to sPower in June 2015. Although sPower
wasn’t bound by Wasatch Wind’s agreement with NMA, it nonetheless attempted to
negotiate purchasing the NMA members’ property. But sPower was unwilling to pay the
$10,000 per acre price agreed to by Wasatch Wind under the expired option agreement,
and ultimately was only successful in persuading one of NMA’s members to sell for what
sPower believed was a more reasonable price.
When sPower began physically constructing the park, NMA and others (including
a competing wind power company) complained to the county that sPower wasn’t satisfying
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its permit’s conditions, including what NMA believed, based on Wasatch Wind’s
representations at the October 2012 planning commission meeting, was a requirement to
either purchase the NMA members’ properties or make financial mitigation payments to
them.
The county planning commission, in response, held a revocation hearing on
sPower’s permit in September 2015. sPower representatives appeared at the hearing and
asserted its compliance with the permit’s conditions, providing various studies and
documentation to support their representations. Although NMA members wished to
participate in the revocation hearing, the planning commission told them that they could
not actively participate. After the hearing, the planning commission voted not to revoke
sPower’s permit.
NMA appealed the planning commission’s decision under San Juan County Zoning
Ordinance (SJCZO) 2-2(2), which broadly allows “any person affected by the land use
authority’s decision applying a land use ordinance” to appeal the decision to the county’s
appeal authority, the county commission. (NMA2R.549-50.)1 NMA and sPower submitted
briefs to the county commission, and the planning commission submitted a report
explaining its decision.
The county commission heard arguments from attorneys representing both NMA
and sPower, and issued a Written Decision in December 2015 wherein it determined in part
The record in district court case no. 170700006 is referred to herein as “NMA2R.” and
the record in district court case no. 160700001 is referred to as “NMA1R.”
1

9

that, because sPower hadn’t done more than just represent that it had done studies regarding
mitigating flicker, light, and sound impacts, it hadn’t provided sufficient evidence to allow
the county commission to affirm the planning commission’s decision.2 The county
commission therefore reversed and remanded the matter to the planning commission for
further review. Although the county commission determined that NMA had no right to
participate in the revocation hearing, it nonetheless ordered the planning commission to
allow NMA’s participation anyway, since it was going to be reconsidering the matter.
sPower wrote the county commission the following day, expressing its confusion at
the commission’s assertion that sPower had presented no evidence beyond its
representations that it was complying with the permit’s conditions, since it asserted it had
provided the planning commission with voluminous studies and other documentation.
sPower asked the county commission to reconsider its decision, warning that the ruling
jeopardized its financing, and it would lose more than $100 million if it were unable to start
operations. sPower didn’t serve its letter on NMA, and the county commission neglected
to inform NMA of sPower’s request.
The county commission met in a closed session to consider sPower’s request, and a
few days later issued an Amendment to Written Decision (“Amended Decision”). In it, the
county commission explained that it had mistakenly not considered sPower’s mitigation

This assessment appears to have come as a surprise to the decision’s drafter, whose
bracketed question remained in the final document: “[Is this truly all the evidence there is
in the record on appeal?].” (NMA1R.0179.)
2
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evidence when it issued its original decision, and that, after having reviewed it, the county
commission instead affirmed the planning commission’s decision not to revoke sPower’s
permit, and therefore also did not remand the matter for its reconsideration or to allow
NMA’s participation. One of the three commissioners wrote a separate dissent.
NMA petitioned for review to the Utah Seventh District Court, case number
160700001 (“NMA 1”), arguing that the county commission’s finding that sPower was
complying with its permit’s conditions wasn’t supported by substantial evidence,
particularly that sPower wasn’t complying with what NMA called self-imposed conditions,
like the financial payments and ice throw mitigation Wasatch Wind had mentioned during
its October 2012 permit hearing. NMA also alleged that the county commission’s decision
was illegal because it wasn’t allowed to reconsider its initial written decision.
On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court implicitly agreed with
respondents San Juan County and the San Juan County Commission (“County”) that the
permit’s only conditions were to mitigate flicker, light, and sound impacts and to ensure
that any land purchase or lease deals were in writing. The district court concluded that the
county commission’s decision was supported by substantial evidence, and held that the
county commission had inherent authority to reconsider its initial decision, but that it had
violated NMA’s due process rights by not giving it a chance to respond to sPower’s request
for reconsideration. The district court then remanded the matter back to the county
commission for proceedings consistent with its ruling.
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On remand, the county commission scheduled a hearing on sPower’s request for
reconsideration and accepted briefing from both sPower and NMA. It heard arguments
from counsel for both parties and issued its unanimous Amended Written Decision on
Remand (“Remand Decision”) in February 2017. The county commission affirmed the
planning commission’s decision and found that its conclusion that sPower was complying
with its permit’s conditions was supported by substantial evidence. The county commission
also reaffirmed its holding that NMA had no right to participate in the revocation hearing.
NMA again petitioned for review in the Utah Seventh District Court, case number
170700006 (“NMA 2”).
In the interim, the Utah Supreme Court had decided McElhaney v. City of Moab,
2017 UT 65, 423 P.3d 1284, wherein it held that the Moab City Council failed to provide
adequate findings of fact and conclusions of law to allow judicial review of its denial of an
application for a conditional use permit for a bed and breakfast. NMA framed McElhaney
as new law in NMA 2, and argued that the matter should be remanded to the planning
commission because it hadn’t provided adequate findings to allow the county
commission’s or the district court’s review. NMA also argued again that the county
commission was prohibited from reconsidering its decision and that its conclusion that
sPower was meeting its permit’s conditions wasn’t supported by substantial evidence.
The district court held that the county commission had cured the due process
violation on remand, and otherwise reiterated its conclusions in NMA 1 that the county
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commission could reconsider its decision and that its determination that sPower was
complying with its permit’s conditions was supported by substantial evidence.
NMA then brought this appeal, raising three issues: (1) whether the planning
commission failed to provide adequate findings per McElhaney to allow the county
commission’s and district court’s review; (2) whether the planning commission denied
NMA due process when it didn’t allow NMA members to participate in sPower’s
revocation hearing; and (3) whether the county commission lacked authority to reconsider
its initial decision. The County reorders these issues in its response in order to address the
threshold issue of reconsideration first.
As the district court correctly held, unless a statute provides otherwise, tribunals
have inherent authority to reconsider their decisions. Because the decision being appealed
is the district court’s, the planning commission’s findings aren’t at issue. But, even if they
were, they’re adequate for the matter reviewed here (a decision not to revoke an existing
conditional use permit), as opposed to the decision being reviewed in McElhaney (a denial
of a conditional use permit application). Finally, NMA lacks a protectable property interest
in the County’s enforcement of its laws that would have given it a due process right to
participate in sPower’s revocation hearing. The County and sPower therefore ask the Court
to affirm.
//
//
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
First Issue. Did the district court correctly hold that the county commission (acting as the
county’s land use appeal authority) had, and wasn’t prohibited from exercising by any
provision in state or local law, inherent authority to reconsider its initial decision on NMA’s
land use appeal?
Standard of Review and Preservation: Correctness. When considering a district court’s
review of a county appeal authority’s decision, the appellate court “afford[s] no deference
to the intermediate court’s decision and appl[ies] the statutorily defined standard to
determine whether the court correctly determined whether the administrative decision was
arbitrary, capricious, or illegal.” McElhaney, 2017 UT 65, ¶ 26. The applicable statutorily
defined standard “presume[s] that a final decision of . . . an appeal authority is valid,” and
requires the decision be upheld unless it is arbitrary and capricious or illegal. Utah Code §
17-27a-801(3)(b). Whether the appeal authority acted within its authority to reconsider its
initial decision is a legal question. A decision is illegal if it is contrary to law. Utah Code
§ 17-27a-801(3)(c)(ii). This issue is preserved at NMA2R.2877-78 & NMA1R.3163-65.
Second Issue. Assuming the county commission could reconsider its initial decision, did
McElhaney require the district court to go beyond its statutory review of the county
commission’s written decision and also determine whether the planning commission’s
decision was supported by findings adequate for a substantial evidence review?
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Standard of Review and Preservation: Correctness, for the same reasons as the first issue.
The County and sPower contend that this issue is unpreserved as explained in Part II.A of
their argument below.
Third Issue. Assuming the county commission could reconsider its initial decision, did
NMA have a due process right to be heard at the planning commission’s revocation hearing
on sPower’s conditional use permit?
Standard of Review and Preservation: Correctness, for the same reasons as the first issue.
This issue is preserved at NMA2R.1972 & 1975.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Relevant Facts
The county planning commission issued the amended conditional use permit at issue
for the Latigo wind power project to sPower’s predecessor in interest, Wasatch Wind, at a
4 October 2012 planning commission meeting.3 (NMA2R.0717-18, 0998, 1003-04.) At
that meeting, Wasatch Wind made various representations about what it voluntarily would
do to address flicker, light, sound, and other impacts on the surrounding area, including
efforts to purchase the NMA members’ properties or make mitigation payments to them.
(NMA2R.0930-0947, 0961-65.) It also submitted a document setting forth proposed
findings, conclusions, and conditions (Summary of Findings and Conclusions) that set forth
3

The Latigo project is actually owned by Latigo Wind Park, LLC. For simplicity on appeal,
this brief refers simply to Latigo Wind Park, LLC’s owners and managers (first Wasatch
Wind and later sPower), as those were the entities that appeared before the relevant
commissions on behalf of Latigo Wind Park, LLC.
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several representations made by Wasatch Wind about how it intended to build the Latigo
project and treat NMA. Wasatch Wind’s attorney, Tom Ellison, referenced it at the hearing,
describing “the second document that I brought to the table, and it addresses, or I mean,
this is a proposed set of findings.” But the document was not adopted by the planning
commission as embodying conditions on the permit. (NMA2R.0713, 0938, 0961, 0963-65,
0974.)
As amended by the planning commission, the following conditions were added to
the permit:
[I]ncorporate as much flicker, light, sound[] mitigation as possible, and to
meet all industry standards of those challenges, . . . and reiterating that all
and any new land purchase lease deals be in writing for any contiguous and
affected landowners. . . . [A]ny mitigation and standards and conditions of
this CUP must be met by any and all project development people, be they
owners now or in the future, and all of these be met at the time of building
permit issuance.
(NMA2R.0711, 0194-0214, 0998, 1003-04.)
Following the planning commission’s grant of the permit to Wasatch Wind, sPower
acquired the Latigo project. (NMA2R.0171.)
Sometime after that, upon receiving complaints, including from NMA, that sPower
was not complying with the permit’s conditions, the planning commission met to consider
whether to revoke the permit. (NMA2R.0230, 0711.) It received evidence and testimony
from sPower, including studies, information on thresholds, how they were determined, and
what neighboring lands were affected. (NMA2R.0711, 0714, 0721-22.) sPower provided
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the county evidence of its mitigation efforts, including the following related to flicker (the
shadows cast by moving blades), light, and sound:
A.

Flicker
i. A 2012 DNV KEMA flicker study based on assumed use of Vesta turbines
with a ninety-foot hub height found that two properties, a residence, and the
Discovery School might by impacted by flicker.
ii. sPower changed turbine locations in order to decrease impacts on nearby
properties, and it chose to use GE turbines with an 80-foot hub height.
iii. sPower hired DNV KEMA to do an updated analysis accounting for the
changed locations and turbines. A 2015 report found that, at worst, flicker
impact would not exceed industry guidelines on any nearby properties.
iv. There are no industry standards for limiting flicker on vacant agricultural
land like that of the NMA members. Even the Massachusetts and Oregon
standards NMA frequently cites do not have such standards.
(NMA2R.1749-51, 2038-40, 2103-04, 2141-60.)

B.

Light
i. sPower worked with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to reduce
the number of turbines required to have navigation lights from 27 to 14.
(NMA2R.1751-52.)
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ii. sPower also developed a lighting plan for its substation and operations
building that eliminated lighting at night unless the buildings are in use.
Downward facing lights are used wherever possible. (NMA2R.1752, 204142, 2103-04, 2108-11.)
C.

Sound
i. A December 2013 sound study based on Vestas turbines found that no
adjacent property with existing residences or businesses exceeded sound
standards. Although there was no industry standard for undeveloped
agricultural property, Wasatch Wind sought to limit noise exposure to 49
decibels for such properties. The report found that a part of one NMA
property might exceed 47 decibels, the limit for developed residential
property.
ii. sPower decided against turbines from Siemens and Vestas in favor of a
new turbine manufactured by GE that ran quieter than the Vestas model.
iii. sPower conducted sound studies to confirm that, through its placement of
turbines and selection of a quieter turbine, the wind park met all sound limits
for existing residences and businesses. There is no industry sound standard
for vacant agricultural land, and a 2015 sound study based on the quieter GE
turbines sPower selected found that the impact would be a decibel less. One
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NMA member’s parcel still might experience noise higher than 47 decibels,
the accepted limit for residential property.
(NMA2R.1749, 2042-44, 2103-04, 2108-39.)
Procedural History
NMA appealed the planning commission’s 14 September 2015 decision not to
revoke sPower’s permit, asserting that the planning commission erred when it determined
that sPower was satisfactorily meeting the permit’s conditions. (NMA2R.0712-13, 1969.)
The county commission, acting as the county’s land use appeal authority, held a
hearing on NMA’s appeal. It received briefing from the planning commission, NMA, and
sPower, and heard from both NMA and sPower at the hearing. (NMA2R.0174, 0186-0266,
0464-0729, 1772-1968.) The county commission issued a written decision reversing and
remanding the planning commission’s decision that sPower had complied with the permit’s
requirement that it mitigate flicker, light, and sound because the county commission said
it had not received any evidence of studies or mitigation beyond sPower’s representations.
(NMA2R.0144, 0178-79.)
sPower’s attorneys wrote to the county commission immediately after the decision
issued, noting that, contrary to its written decision, sPower had provided the county with
relevant studies on sound, light, and flicker, and requested that the county commission
reconsider its decision. The letter, however, was not copied to NMA. (NMA2R.0168-72.)
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The county commission then issued its Amended Decision, wherein it
acknowledged that it had issued its prior decision without considering the mitigation
evidence sPower had presented. The commission stated that it had since reviewed sPower’s
evidence after having its attention called to it, and had decided to amend its decision to
instead uphold the planning commission’s decision not to revoke the permit because
sPower had satisfied its conditions to implement flicker, sound, and light mitigation as
much as possible according to industry standards. (NMA2R.0145-46.) The county
commission, however, didn’t give NMA a chance to respond to sPower’s request to
reconsider. (NMA2R.2876.)
NMA petitioned for review of the amended decision to the district court in NMA 1.
It asserted that the county commission’s decision was arbitrary and capricious because the
sound exceeded 55 decibels on some NMA property, sPower had not used dark sky
technology, and sPower had not met self-imposed conditions regarding ice throw,
purchasing NMA properties, or making mitigation payments. (NMA1R.0128-29.) While
the Court held that it could not “find that the County’s decision was unsupported by
substantial evidence” and that every tribunal has inherent authority to correct its mistakes
(NMA1R.3163-64), it nonetheless held that the County’s decision was illegal because it
had deprived NMA of due process when it considered sPower’s reconsideration request
without giving NMA notice or an opportunity to be heard. (NMA1R.3164-65.) The district

20

court remanded the dispute to the county commission to take action consistent with its
order. (NMA1R.03243.)
On remand, the County asked for briefing on the issues raised by sPower’s letter,
which both sPower and NMA submitted. The County held a hearing on 3 January 2017, at
which both sPower and NMA appeared and made arguments. The County also limited
sPower and NMA to the record as already constituted. (NMA2R.1975, 1977.)
The County issued its Amended Decision on 21 February 2017. In it, the County
found that “sPower had, indeed, submitted extensive documentation, including studies and
reports, to the Planning Commission regarding its efforts to mitigate light, sound and
flicker,” and that, therefore, the County’s “statement that sPower had offered nothing more
than bare oral representations was, we now recognize, erroneous.” (NMA2R.1977.) In light
of that evidence, the County decided that it could not say that “the Planning Commission’s
decision not to revoke the Latigo CUP lacked substantial evidence.” The County held that
it would not, “in light of the record evidence,” “disturb the Planning Commission’s
conclusions that sPower has and is meeting the Latigo CUP’s conditions and its decision
not to revoke the permit.” (NMA2R.1978.) Finally, the County reversed its remand
instruction to allow NMA to address the planning commission. It explained that, “upon
rehearing and considering all the record evidence,” it “no longer view[ed] such a remand
as helpful because now its sole purpose would be to allow NMA to comment, which [it]
ha[d] determined is not a right that the Planning Commission was obligated to recognize.”
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(NMA2R.1978-79.) NMA then commenced the underlying action, NMA 2, by petitioning
the district court for review a second time.
Disposition Below
The County and NMA filed cross-motions for summary judgment in the district
court. (NMA 2, Index.) sPower intervened and opposed NMA’s motion. (Id.) The district
court heard argument on the motions and entered an order denying NMA’s motion and
granting the County’s. (NMA2R.2875-79.) The district court explained that, “as it ha[d]
considered and decided these matters on effectively the same record in NMA I once before,
[it could] determine that it need not reconsider them and instead rely on its prior
determination that, but for the due process violation, the county commission’s decision was
not illegal and was supported by substantial evidence.” (NMA2R.2877.) Finding that the
County had followed its instruction to cure the due process violation it had found in NMA
1, the district court granted the County’s motion. (NMA2R.2878.) This appeal followed.
(NMA2R.2880-82.)
ARGUMENT SUMMARY
The County’s and sPower’s argument begins by addressing the threshold issue
whether the county commission had inherent authority to reconsider its initial decision
because, if it didn’t, the other issues NMA raises on appeal would be moot. The County
and sPower argue, based on Utah precedent recognizing it, that the county commission had
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inherent authority to reconsider its initial decision on NMA’s appeal from the planning
commission’s decision not to revoke sPower’s conditional use permit.
Next, the County and sPower argue that, contrary to NMA’s assertions, the
McElhaney opinion did not require the district court to remand this dispute all the way back
to the planning commission to require it to hear evidence from NMA and make more
extensive findings. The district court’s, not the county commission’s, decision is under
review here, and, even assuming the Court could reach the question of the adequacy of the
planning commission’s findings for review, its report to the county commission was
sufficient under the circumstances. The County and sPower also challenge NMA’s
substantial evidence analysis as irrelevant to the question it poses—whether the planning
commission made adequate findings as NMA argues McElhaney requires for the county
commission’s review. Nonetheless, the County and sPower also show that the district court
correctly found that the county commission’s decision was supported by substantial
evidence.
Finally, the County and sPower address NMA’s argument that the County violated
NMA’s due process rights by refusing to allow its members to participate in sPower’s
revocation hearing. NMA is essentially claiming a protectable property interest in the
County’s enforcement of its laws against NMA’s neighbor. But since the decision whether
to revoke a permit is within the planning commission’s discretion, NMA lacks a protectable
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property interest that would allow it to claim due process rights to participate in the
revocation hearing on its neighbor’s permit.
ARGUMENT
I.

The county commission’s inherent authority to reconsider its initial decision
isn’t proscribed by statute or ordinance. (responding to Point III of NMA’s brief,
pages 40-444)
NMA makes two arguments challenging the county commission’s reconsideration

of its initial decision. It first asserts that the county commission’s inherent authority
permitted it only to enact ordinances allowing it to reconsider its decision, and that, because
it hadn’t done so, it lacked the authority to reconsider. That argument both misunderstands
the nature of inherent authority and misinterprets controlling case law. Second, NMA
claims that, even if the county commission would otherwise have had inherent authority to
reconsider its initial decision, it lacked that authority here because it was proscribed by
statute and ordinance. NMA, however, interprets the statutes and ordinances it relies upon
too broadly—they do not address the county commission’s inherent authority to reconsider
its decisions.
“Inherent in the power to make an administrative decision is the authority to
reconsider a decision. The absence of specific authority in the governing statutes is not
determinative. Every tribunal has some power to correct its own mistakes.” Clark v.
Hansen, 631 P.2d 914, 915 (Utah 1981) (citations omitted). See also DLB Collection Trust
The County herein uses NMA’s page numbers, not the page numbers from its brief’s PDF
file.
4
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by Helgesen & Waterfall v. Harris, 893 P.2d 593, 595 n. 1 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (describing
Clark’s conclusion as “axiomatic”). “Utah is among the majority of western states to have
held that administrative agencies have the power to reconsider their decisions in the
absence of statutory provisions to the contrary.” Career Service Review Board v. Utah
Dep’t of Corrections, 942 P.2d 933, 945 (Utah 1997) (“CSRB”). In CSRB, the Utah
Supreme Court held that the board retained jurisdiction to reconsider and modify its order
“[u]ntil an appeal was perfected.” Id. at 946.
NMA attempts to distinguish Clark, arguing that the opinion recognized only that
the State Engineer had inherent “authority to adopt rules which provide for rehearings.”
Clark, 631 P.2d at 915. While in Clark the State Engineer had made rules regarding
rehearings, the supreme court’s characterization of inherent authority was broader; it
recognized that the authority to reconsider was inherent in “the power to make an
administrative decision,” not in the power to pass rules. Id. NMA’s narrow interpretation
also ignores the supreme court’s endorsement of a broader reading in CSRB. There, after
finding that the board lacked “any explicit statutory authority to make subsequent
modification to previously entered orders,” CSRB, 942 P.2d at 945, the court nonetheless
held that the board “retained jurisdiction and had the inherent authority to reconsider and
modify its [order] in light of subsequently discovered facts,” id. at 946. The supreme court
explained that, in Clark, it had joined those jurisdictions holding that administrative
tribunals’ authority to modify orders still under their control “is inherent and exists
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independent of, or apart from, any statutory authority.” Id. at 945. Unlike Clark, CSRB was
not decided on an administrative rule allowing reconsideration, and it explicitly rejected
the argument NMA attempts here—that an administrative body’s authority to amend or
modify its decision is entirely statutory. Id.
This conclusion is both consistent with the nature of inherent authority and avoids
the absurdity the narrower reading NMA proposes would allow. If, as NMA argues, a
secondary step were necessary before an administrative entity could exercise its inherent
authority (by passing a rule or an ordinance, for example), then the authority would cease
to be “involved in the constitution or essential character” of its decision-making power.
Merriam-Webster.com, inherent, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/inherent
(last visited Nov. 5, 2018). Curtailing administrative entities’ exercise of their inherent
authority to only those circumstances where they have passed rules or ordinances
authorizing its use would present situations where an obvious error couldn’t be addressed,
needlessly prolonging the litigation and increasing expenses, all while the administrative
tribunal could simply make a quick fix to save all parties time and money.
NMA next argues that, even assuming the county commission had inherent
authority to reconsider its decision here, statutes and ordinances proscribed it. But the best
NMA can muster in support are general provisions related to land use appeals and review
that unsurprisingly don’t mention reconsideration, and fall far short of the contrary
provisions required to abrogate inherent authority.
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Section 17-27a-701(2) requires would-be petitioners for judicial review to first
challenge a land use decision “in accordance with local ordinance.” Utah Code § 17-27a701(2). Section 17-27a-706(1) similarly requires county appeal authorities to conduct each
appeal “as described by local ordinance.” Utah Code § 17-27a-706(1). Section 17-27a-801
allows those adversely affected by a final decision to “file a petition for review of the
decision with the district court within 30 days after the decision is final.” Utah Code § 1727a-801(2)(a). And, finally, San Juan County Zoning Ordinance § 2-2 sets forth the
procedure for appealing from a land use decision, but lacks any provision expressly
authorizing reconsideration. (NMA2R.0287-88.) NMA argues that, since the foregoing
provisions of the County Land Use, Development, and Management Act (“CLUDMA”)
defer to local ordinances governing land use appeals, and the county’s land use appeals
ordinances don’t contain a reconsideration provision, CLUDMA effectively proscribes
reconsideration. (NMA’s Br. at 42.) Not only, however, does that interpretation ignore
Clark’s instruction that “[t]he absence of specific authority in the governing statutes is not
determinative,” Clark, 631 P.2d at 915, but it also falls short of the “provisions to the
contrary” required to extinguish the county commission’s inherent authority. CSRB, 942
P.2d at 945.5 Statutes and ordinances setting forth the process to be used to appeal and seek
review of land use decisions aren’t “provisions to the contrary.”

NMA erroneously summarizes this language from CSRB as holding that “the inherent
power to reconsider does not exist where no statutory provisions state to the contrary.”
(NMA’s Br. at 42.) The case actually states the opposite: “[A]dministrative agencies have
5
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Thus, that CLUDMA lacks what NMA calls a “global automatic initiation”
provision (NMA’s Br. at 42) similar to the Utah Administrative Procedures Act’s (UAPA)
section 63G-4-302 (which expressly allows for a motion to reconsider from a final agency
decision, Utah Code § 63G-4-302) is inapposite. Inherent authority doesn’t require an
enabling statute; and it can only be extinguished by an affirmative act. CSRB itself
demonstrates as much. There, the supreme court found the board’s attempt to justify its
decision to revisit a prior order under the UAPA “unconvincing” before affirming the
board’s action instead under its inherent authority—without referencing section 63G-4-302
(then numbered as Utah Code § 63-46b-13 (1997)). CSRB, 942 P.2d at 943-46. Even
though CLUDMA and the county’s ordinances don’t expressly provide for reconsideration,
therefore, they don’t expressly prohibit it, and therefore the county commission’s inherent
authority persists.6
Utah recognizes the county commission’s inherent authority to reconsider its initial
decision in the absence of a statute or ordinance expressly limiting that authority. Because
the power to reconsider their decisions in the absence of statutory provisions to the
contrary.” CSRB, 942 P.2d at 945.
This is also why NMA’s reference to Gillett v. Price’s holding, 2006 UT 24, ¶ 8, 135 P.3d
861, that parties seeking reconsideration in a district court proceeding must follow one or
more of the multiple avenues that allow for reconsideration under the civil rules (NMA’s
Br. at 42, n. 1) is inapt. There are no rules regarding reconsideration applicable to county
appeal authorities that mimic the state rules of civil procedure. Land use appeals are
governed by state law and county ordinances, and in this case neither adopted the civil
procedure rules. More importantly, nowhere does Gillett overturn the supreme court’s
recognition of the state’s administrative tribunals’ inherent authority to correct their own
mistakes.
6
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NMA fails to identify any statute or ordinance that prohibited the county commission from
exercising that authority here, the county commission’s reconsideration was legal, and its
amended decision on remand should not be overturned on that ground.
II.

The McElhaney opinion didn’t require the district court to go back and
evaluate whether the planning commission provided sufficient findings to allow
the county commission to determine that its decision was supported by
substantial evidence. (responding to Part I of NMA’s brief, pages 18-34)
The district court reviewed the record when it ruled in NMA 1 that the county

commission’s decision was supported by substantial evidence. Despite the issuance of the
supreme court’s McElhaney opinion in the interim, the district court determined that it
didn’t need to revisit the same record in NMA 2 to conclude that its determination still held.
NMA’s argument that McElhaney so substantively changed the law that the district court
needed to go back and review whether the planning commission had provided adequate
findings for the county commission’s review mistakes the decision under review. Even
supposing the Court can reach the planning commission’s decision, its report to the county
commission was adequate under the circumstances. NMA’s substantial evidence challenge
is irrelevant to the issues it raises on appeal, and fails regardless.
A.

The district court’s, not the county commission’s, decision is under review
here, and therefore NMA’s post-hoc argument that the planning
commission’s report to county commission was inadequate under
McElhaney is inapposite.

NMA doesn’t dispute that the county commission’s Amended Decision and
Remand Decision provided written findings and conclusions adequate to permit the district
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court’s reviews here and in NMA 1. NMA instead argues that the planning commission’s
written report of its decision not to revoke sPower’s permit was insufficient to allow the
county commission’s review. But the district court made the decisions under review here,
not the planning commission. NMA failed, moreover, to preserve any objection to the
planning commission’s report.
McElhaney addressed a district court’s review of a decision made by the Moab City
Council (acting as a land use authority) to deny an applicant a conditional use permit.
McElhaney, 2017 UT 65, ¶ 1. The supreme court clarified that the decision reviewed by an
appellate court isn’t that of the adjudicative body, but rather that of the intermediate
reviewing court. Id., ¶¶ 24-26. The court explained that focusing on the intermediate court’s
decision rather than the adjudicative body’s strengthens the integrity of the appellate
process and provides an incentive for parties “to preserve, develop, narrow and refine the
arguments they may eventually make to an appellate court—an incentive that would not be
as potent if the parties could anticipate getting a second, and entirely fresh, appeal of the
administrative decision.” Id., ¶ 24. This part of the McElhaney opinion, which NMA
ignores, undermines its argument that this matter should be remanded to the county
planning commission because that body didn’t provide adequate findings and conclusions
to the county commission.
McElhaney makes clear that the district court’s, not the county commission’s,
decisions are under review here. Because NMA doesn’t argue that the county commission’s
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written decisions were inadequate to allow the district court’s substantial evidence review,
it cannot simply move the argument down another procedural level in order to claim that
the subsequent decision actually under review is flawed. Allowing parties to skip down to
find alleged deficiencies in decisions made at points in the process prior to the decision
being appealed would foster the same undesirable incentives the supreme court identified
when clarifying that appeals review the intermediate court’s decision: undermining the
appellate process’s integrity by allowing parties to raise otherwise unpreserved issues at
any point.
McElhaney stands for the unsurprising conclusion that, in order for a district court
to effectively review a land use authority’s decision, the land use authority must transmit
sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law to the district court to enable that review.
The supreme court explained that the requirement that a land use authority transmit a record
of its proceedings to the reviewing court implied transmitting the authority’s orders and
findings. McElhaney, 2017 UT 65, ¶ 32. Recognizing an implied requirement isn’t a change
in law. See, e.g., True v. UDOT, 2018 UT App 86, ¶ 35, 427 P.3d 338 (acknowledging as
an exception to the preservation doctrine the possibility that “an intervening change in law
might create exceptional circumstances that could justify addressing an issue uniquely
affected by that intervening change”). The supreme court also noted that the court of
appeals had, in several opinions, “require[d] land use authorities to issue findings of fact
when denying conditional use permits.” McElhaney, 2017 UT 65, ¶ 37. NMA’s argument
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that McElhaney represents new law falls flat when considered against such controlling
precedent. Finally, the supreme court explained that substantial-evidence review is “a term
of art that presupposes written findings.” Id., ¶ 41. Requiring what a statute presupposes is
not new law. So long as the district court had sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of
law from the county commission to conclude in NMA 1 that the decision was supported by
substantial evidence (which NMA doesn’t dispute), therefore, there was no need for the
Court to revisit its holding. The district court had adequate findings to make that evaluation,
and NMA doesn’t argue that it didn’t.
Because McElhaney didn’t change the law, NMA was required to lodge a timely
objection if it believed the planning commission’s report was inadequate for the county
commission’s or the district court’s review. Roundy v. Staley, 1999 UT App 229, ¶ 24, 984
P.2d 404 (“To preserve an issue for appeal, a party claiming error in the admission of
evidence must object on the record in a timely fashion. One who fails to make a necessary
objection or who fails to insure that it is on the record is deemed to have waived the issue.”).
NMA instead waited until NMA 2 and after McElhaney was issued to do so. NMA thus
waived its ability to raise its objection to the planning commission report’s completeness
by its delay in asserting it.
B.

Even supposing the Court could reach the adequacy of the planning
commission’s report, it was sufficient for the county commission’s review.

The planning commission’s report was, regardless whether the Court reaches the
question, adequate for the county commission’s review.
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The difference between the showings required to deny a conditional use permit and
to revoke a conditional use permit is material. The law governing whether a city should
grant an application for a conditional use permit (at issue in McElhaney) requires the city
to issue the permit unless the contemplated use’s reasonably anticipated detrimental effects
cannot be substantially mitigated by imposing reasonable conditions. McElhaney, 2017 UT
65, ¶ 27. Whether a permit should be revoked, in contrast, is left to the planning
commission’s discretion if it finds that the permittee is violating the permit’s conditions.
SJCZO § 6-10 (NMA2R.0299). The city’s findings and conclusions in denying the permit
application in McElhaney, therefore, had to be more detailed than those of the planning
commission here. In McElhaney, the city had to identify the detrimental effects it
anticipated and explain why conditions couldn’t satisfactorily mitigate them. Here, the
planning commission merely had to state that it had reviewed the evidence presented and
found no violation of the permit’s conditions.
All that the planning commission had to do here was to compare the evidence to the
permit’s conditions. If the evidence showed a violation, the planning commission could
revoke the permit; and if not, it would not. The county commission’s review was even more
limited—whether the planning commission’s finding that sPower wasn’t violating its
permit’s conditions was itself supported by substantial evidence. Under these
circumstances, the planning commission’s written report explaining that sPower had made
a presentation and provided “studies concerning sound, flicker, and light,” as well as
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“information on thresholds and how they were determined and what neighboring lands
were affected” (NMA1R.2645) was sufficient.
In fact, the absence of any written report or decision in McElhaney is a critical
distinction. Not only did the land use authority have to provide a more thorough
explanation for its decision in McElhaney, but there was no written report at all. Here,
however, the planning commission provided the county commission with a written report
explaining why it determined it could not enforce NMA’s so-called self-imposed
conditions and that, based on the studies it received from sPower “concerning sound,
flicker, and light,” including thresholds and how there were determined and the
neighboring properties affected, it unanimously determined that the conditions were met.
(NMA2R.0711-24.) That NMA wants more detail is irrelevant. There was enough in the
report for the county commission, upon reviewing the same evidence, to determine that the
planning commission’s decision was supported by substantial evidence, i.e., enough to
“convince a reasonable mind” that sPower wasn’t violating the permit’s conditions.
Patterson v. Utah County Bd. of Adj., 893 P.2d 602, 604 n. 6 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (cleaned
up). The district court, whose substantial evidence determination NMA doesn’t challenge
on appeal, did nothing more.
The substantial evidence standard applies to many different kinds of land use
decisions, and, like any standard of review, the showing the standard requires changes with
the elements of the claim being appealed. Here, the permit’s conditions were set, as was
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the record. All that was required was a determination that the record did not show a
violation of the known conditions. In McElhaney, however, the detrimental effects were
unknown, as were the possible conditions and whether they might mitigate the detrimental
effects. McElhaney, 2017 UT 65, ¶¶ 29-30. There needed to be more detailed findings in
McElhaney than here, where the planning commission’s report provided adequate basis for
the county commission’s review.
C.

NMA’s substantial evidence analysis is unrelated to whether the planning
commission’s report was adequate under McElhaney, but, even if it were
related, the district court correctly affirmed the county commission’s
decision.

For some reason, NMA tucks a lengthy substantial evidence analysis into its
argument on the McElhaney issue it raises on appeal. Whether the district court’s holding
is supported by substantial evidence is unrelated to whether the McElhaney opinion
required the planning commission to provide the county commission with more detailed
and extensive findings (NMA’s “Issue 1”). Even if it were, NMA’s reliance on the wholerecord test in an attempt to weaken the substantial evidence test is misplaced, since, even
if the test applies, NMA hasn’t performed the required marshaling. The district court’s
holding that sPower is complying with the permit’s conditions is, moreover, supported by
substantial evidence.
//
//
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1.

NMA doesn’t raise a substantial evidence challenge on appeal, and its
analysis is therefore irrelevant.

Although NMA doesn’t raise a substantial evidence challenge on appeal, it
dedicates a substantial number of pages to arguing that the district court’s—or at times that
the county commission’s, or the planning commission’s—decision didn’t satisfy that
standard when finding that sPower was complying with its permit’s conditions. Those
arguments are, however, irrelevant to the issues NMA has raised on appeal and should be
disregarded.
NMA raises three issues on appeal, none of which directly challenge the district
court’s substantial evidence determination. The closest is NMA’s first issue, asking the
Court to decide whether the district court erred when it supposedly refused to review
whether the planning commission’s decision was supported by substantial evidence in light
of the McElhaney opinion. (NMA’s Br. at 2.) (The district court’s conclusion that it saw
no need to reconsider its decision in NMA 1, despite NMA’s McElhaney argument, implies
that the district court simply found the argument unpersuasive.) The other two issues are
further afield: whether due process required the district court to remand the revocation
decision back to the planning commission to allow NMA to participate (second issue), and
whether the county commission could reconsider its initial decision (third issue). (NMA
Br. at 3-4.)
While NMA’s first issue at least contains the phrase substantial evidence, it instead
focuses on NMA’s distinct argument that the planning commission’s report to the county
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commission on its decision was inadequate to allow review under McElhaney, not a
separate challenge to the district court’s holding that the county commission’s decision was
supported by substantial evidence. The issues are distinct, and NMA raised only the former
(whether the planning commission’s report was adequate to allow the county commission’s
review). NMA’s lengthy substantial evidence review is therefore irrelevant and should be
disregarded.
2.

NMA’s reliance on the whole-record test, assuming it even applies
here, fails because NMA hasn’t marshaled the evidence supporting
the district court’s decision.

NMA’s reliance on UAPA’s statutory whole-record test is misplaced. Assuming the
test even applies in this context, NMA fails to marshal the evidence supporting the district
court’s decision. Nor does NMA provide more than a reasonably conflicting view, which
is resolved in the County’s favor.
A county appeal authority’s decision is presumed valid, and reviewed only to
determine, based on the record, whether it is arbitrary, capricious, or illegal. Utah Code §
17-27a-801(3)(a) & (8)(a). The decision at issue here—a county planning commission’s
decision not to revoke a conditional use permit—is an administrative decision reviewed
under the substantial evidence standard. Utah Code § 17-27a-801(3)(b) & (c); Salon
Tropicana Midvale, Inc. v. Midvale City, Case No. 20090057-CA, 2009 UT App 327, *6*8, 2009 Utah App. LEXIS 345 (Nov. 13, 2009) (Mem. Dec.) (unpublished) (reviewing
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city appeal authority’s decision upholding its planning commission’s decision to revoke a
conditional use permit under the substantial evidence standard).
“‘Substantial evidence is that quantum and quality of relevant evidence that is
adequate to convince a reasonable mind to support a conclusion.’” Patterson, 893 P.2d at
604 n. 6 (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. County Bd. of Equalization, 799 P.2d 1163,
1165 (Utah 1990) (quotation marks omitted).) “It is ‘more than a mere scintilla of evidence
. . . though something less than the weight of the evidence.’” Id. (quoting Grace Drilling
Co. v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63, 68 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (quotation marks and citation
omitted)).
NMA charges, based on no evidence whatever, that the district court violated this
standard because it “made no effort to consider evidence that ‘fairly detracted’ from
sPower’s position, in contravention of Utah’s substantial evidence standard.” (NMA’s Br.
at 22.) NMA relies on Grace Drilling for this characterization, which arises from what this
Court termed the whole record test. Under that test, a reviewing court “must consider not
only the evidence supporting the [adjudicative body’s] factual findings, but also the
evidence that fairly detracts from the weight of the [adjudicative body’s] evidence.” Grace
Drilling, 776 P.2d at 68 (cleaned up). That test is, however, specific to UAPA, and even if
it weren’t, NMA hasn’t marshaled the evidence supporting the district court’s decision
sufficient to allow this Court’s review.
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The whole record test is explicitly mandated by UAPA, which allows as one of
several express bases for an appellate court to grant the petitioner relief that “the agency
action is based upon a determination of fact, made or implied by the agency, that is not
supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record before the
court.” Utah Code § 63G-4-403(4)(g); Grace Drilling, 776 P.2d at 66. (At the time Grace
Drilling was decided, this language, which remains unchanged, was found in Utah Code §
63-46b-16(4)(g) (1988).) It appears to be a distinct test from the substantial evidence test,
because the Court differentiates them within the space of two sentences in the opinion.
Grace Drilling, 776 P.2d at 68. Because a phrase similar to “when viewed in light of the
whole record before the court” doesn’t appear in CLUDMA’s judicial review provision,
Utah Code § 17-27a-801, the test doesn’t translate to reviews of land use decisions.
Even if the whole record test did apply to substantial evidence reviews of county
land use decisions, NMA couldn’t rely on it here because it hasn’t marshaled all the
evidence supporting the district court’s decision. The test “necessarily requires that a party
challenging the [adjudicative body’s] findings of fact must marshall all of the evidence
supporting the findings and show that despite the supporting facts, and in light of the
conflicting or contradictory evidence, the findings are not supported by substantial
evidence.” Grace Drilling, 776 P.2d at 68 (emphasis original). While NMA mentions some
of the evidence that supports the district court’s decision, it falls far short of marshaling all
the supporting evidence in the record.
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“To satisfy its marshaling burden, the [challenger] need[s] to marshal all of the
evidence supporting the Board’s findings, not simply the evidence supporting its preferred
interpretation.” Uintah County v. Dep’t of Workforce Servs., 2014 UT App 44, ¶ 7, 320
P.3d 1103 (cleaned up). “When a party challenging a factual finding fails to marshal the
evidence in support of that finding, we assume that the record supports the finding.” Id.
(cleaned up).
While NMA identifies what it believes the county commission failed to consider
(albeit without support)—its 5 November 2015 memorandum and attached documents
(NMA’s Br. at 22-23)—it falls short marshaling the evidence supporting the county
commission’s findings. NMA appears to argue in its defense that it’s difficult to determine
what the county commission or the district court relied on (NMA Br. at 21-22; NMA Suppl.
at 7-8), even suggesting that the district court might not even have reviewed the record
(NMA Suppl. at 8). But just because the record contains a lot of evidence that supports the
adjudicative body’s findings doesn’t excuse the challenger from marshaling them. And in
reality it shouldn’t be that difficult here, where the county commission set out its findings
in its decisions, and the County and sPower set out their arguments in their memoranda
that the district court implicitly adopted. Because NMA fails to carry its burden, its
argument that the county commission’s and the district court’s decisions weren’t supported
by substantial evidence fail, even under the whole record test.
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NMA presents, at most, a conflicting view of the evidence in support of its position.
But, when undertaking a substantial evidence review, a court “will not substitute its
judgment as between two reasonably conflicting views, even though [it] may have come
to a different conclusion had the case come before it for de novo review.” Grace Drilling,
776 P.2d at 68. Because NMA fails to marshal all of the evidence opposing its own
position, and then show that the district court’s conflicting view of the evidence is
unreasonable, its substantial evidence challenge fails. “It is,” after all, “the province of the
[adjudicative body], not appellate courts, to resolve conflicting evidence, and where
inconsistent inferences can be drawn from the same evidence, it is for the [adjudicative
body] to draw the inferences.” Id.
Though NMA doesn’t raise it as an express issue, throughout its brief it argues that
the record is unreliable because it contains materials submitted to the county commission
that weren’t before the planning commission when it made its decision, particularly a 23
September 2015 letter from sPower, to which was attached several documents showing
sPower’s compliance with the permit’s conditions. (NMA’s Br. at 5-8, 21-22; NMA’s
Suppl. at 3, 5-6.) But NMA waived this objection to evidence in the record long ago, and,
even if it could still object, the same or substantially similar materials appear elsewhere in
the record.
“To preserve an issue for appeal, a party claiming error in the admission of evidence
must object on the record in a timely fashion. One who fails to make a necessary objection

41

or who fails to insure that it is on the record is deemed to have waived the issue.” Roundy,
1999 UT App 229, ¶ 24. NMA failed to timely object to the materials it now claims
shouldn’t be in the record.
CLUDMA provides that, “[i]f there is a record, the district court’s review is limited
to the record provided by the land use authority or appeal authority, as the case may be.”
The district court is prohibited from “accept[ing] or consider[ing] any evidence outside the
record of the land use authority or appeal authority, as the case may be, unless that evidence
was offered to the land use authority or appeal authority, respectively, and the court
determines that it was improperly excluded.” “If there is no record, the court may call
witnesses and take evidence.” Utah Code § 17-27a-801(8). CLUDMA requires appeal
authorities to transmit the record to the reviewing court. Utah Code § 17-27a-801(7)(a).
The County transmitted the record before the county commission to the district court
on 19 May 2016. (NMA 1, Index at 1.) NMA has never formally objected to its contents.
In fact, it appears that the first time NMA even noted any concern that the record was
inaccurate wasn’t until 18 October 2017, when it alleged that there was no evidence that
the planning commission considered the flicker, light, and sound studies attached to a
September 23 letter from sPower. (NMA2R.2391.)
The letter, which was sent to the county attorney, not the county building
department, merely summarizes evidence sPower provided to the planning commission
(NMA2R.1748-55, 2103-04, 2581), which probably explains NMA’s delay in commenting
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on it. Once NMA suggested the material might not have been considered by the planning
commission, the County switched the citations supporting its argument that sPower
presented evidence it was meeting its permit’s conditions to other parts of the record.
(NMA2R.2774-75.) Even supposing NMA’s comments about the September 23 letter were
read as an objection, the County referenced other evidence that still showed sPower met
the permit’s conditions.
In its brief on appeal, NMA has moved beyond questioning the September 23 letter,
going so far as creating, for the first time, a list of all the documents it now contends weren’t
part of the record before the planning commission. (NMA’s Br. at 9-10 & Add. I.) NMA
argues that the inclusion of that evidence violated Utah Code § 17-27a-707, which
implicitly limited the county commission’s review to the record because the County had
by ordinance designated a scope of review. (Id.) See SJCZO § 2-2(2)(e) (establishing an
arbitrary-and-capricious standard of review). NMA’s argument, however, comes too late.
As the Court explained in Roundy, objections to evidence must be made “in a timely
fashion” or they are waived. Roundy, 1999 UT App 229, ¶ 24. NMA’s objections to the
record here—if they can be considered objections—are untimely and have been waived.
The record of the county commission’s decision was transmitted to the district court in
May 2016 in NMA 1. NMA first noted concern about the record in October 2017 in NMA
2, which consisted of alleging that there was nothing in the record demonstrating that the
planning commission had considered the studies attached to the September 23 letter.
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Between those dates, the district court rendered its decision in NMA 1, holding that
substantial evidence supported the county commission’s decision (NMA1R.3163), the
county commission received briefs and heard argument on sPower’s request to reconsider
and issued a decision (NMA2R.1970-81), and NMA petitioned for review a second time
(NMA2R.0001-0035). And NMA didn’t raise its objections beyond sPower’s September
23 letter until its opening brief on this appeal. Because an objection to evidence raised after
a decision has been rendered is untimely, see, e.g., 438 Main Street v. Easy Heat, Inc., 2004
UT 72, ¶ 51, 99 P.3d 801 (“In order to preserve an issue for appeal, the issue must be
presented to the trial court in such a way that the trial court has an opportunity to rule on
that issue.” (cleaned up)), NMA has waived its objections to the record.7
3.

Finally, even if NMA had raised the district court’s substantial
evidence decision as an issue here, the court correctly affirmed the
county commission’s decision.

The permit’s only conditions relevant here deal with flicker, light, and sound. The
county required Wasatch Wind to provide as much mitigation of these impacts as possible.
In its briefing in NMA 1, the County argued that meant as much mitigation as can be
required by industry standards (NMA1R.3141-43), and the district court implicitly agreed.
NMA has not challenged that holding. Until now, NMA has argued that the other

This same analysis applies to NMA’s objection to Sean McBride’s 22 December 2016
declaration (NMA’s Br. at 19, n. 5) (although there’s no indication the County relied on
it—the opposite, in fact (NMA2R.1977)). NMA failed to object to the declaration before
the county commission and the district court before raising the issue here. It has therefore
waived its objection.
7
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conditions it contends apply to sPower’s permit (e.g., financial mitigation, dark sky
technology, ice throw) were “self-imposed” conditions adopted by Wasatch Wind and
enforceable against sPower, even though not formally adopted by the County.
On this appeal, however, NMA argues that the permit’s conditions actually include
a financial mitigation requirement, although perhaps the planning commission failed “to
clearly enunciate” it.8 (NMA’s Br. at 26.) NMA asserts that the condition “reiterating that
all and any new land purchase lease deals be in writing for any contiguous and affected
landowners” adopts Wasatch Wind’s assertion at the October 2012 hearing that it would
either buy or make financial mitigation payments to NMA’s members. (NMA’s Br. at 24,
27-28.) This argument is both waived and unsupported.
Because NMA didn’t raise this argument—that the requirement that new land
purchase or lease deals be in writing is really the financial mitigation condition in
disguise—until now, it’s been waived. “Issues not raised before the district court are
normally waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.” Gardner v. Bd. of
County Comm’rs, 2008 UT 6, ¶ 32, 178 P.3d 893. The Court therefore need not address it.
Even were the Court to address this argument, it fails because it seeks to expand the
permit’s application beyond its plain language. The condition is plainly limited to “new

NMA also contends that “sPower conceded that there is a financial mitigation condition
in the Amended CUP” because, in its memorandum opposing NMA’s motion for summary
judgment in NMA 1, sPower asserted that it had “satisfied ‘financial mitigation’
commitments.” (NMA Suppl. at 3, n. 4.) But sPower refers to commitments, not conditions,
and its use of scare quotes indicates its disagreement with NMA’s characterization.
8
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land purchase [or] lease deals,” and simply requires that they “be in writing.” This is not
ambiguous and it is not a requirement that Wasatch Wind or its successors in interest
purchase the NMA members’ properties or, alternatively, provide them financial
mitigation.
NMA also generally criticizes sPower’s micrositing of its turbines after receiving
its permit. Relying on a definition from an anti-wind-energy website, NMA contends that
sPower’s rearrangement went beyond micrositing. (NMA’s Br. at 28-29 & n. 8.) The
County and sPower object to NMA’s citation to the National Wind Watch website because
it is outside the record and lacks foundation. (National Wind Watch is alleged to be
connected to the fossil fuel industry. See https://www.energyandpolicy.org/tom-stacy-antiwind-activist/ (last visited 4 December 2018).)
The County and sPower readily agree with NMA that, had sPower relocated one of
its turbines inside Monticello city limits, it would have been handled differently. (NMA’s
Br. at 33.) But that’s not because the County is for some reason targeting NMA, but rather
because the city is a different jurisdiction, isn’t zoned agricultural, and most likely the
turbine would be located on developed land.
As for the flicker, light, and sound mitigation requirements, NMA cannot show that
the evidence supporting the district court’s decision was unlikely to convince a reasonable
mind. The County and sPower address each requirement below.
//
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i.

Flicker

sPower provided evidence that, even using the taller Vesta turbines originally
planned, just one residence and a school would be impacted by flicker. But sPower
relocated turbines to decrease those impacts and used shorter GE turbines. A 2015 analysis
based on the relocated turbines and the GE turbines found that flicker wouldn’t exceed
industry guidelines on any nearby properties. (There are no industry standards for flicker
for vacant agricultural land like the NMA members’.)
NMA’s sole evidence supporting its contention that its members’ properties are
adversely affected by flicker is its speculation that sPower’s relocation of turbines to be
farther away from the residence and school brought them closer to its members’ properties
and therefore must have had increased flicker impact on those properties. (NMA’s Br. at
29.) But, even were that so, there is no industry standard against which to assess the impact
and it doesn’t show that the County’s view of the evidence was unreasonable.
sPower’s evidence was adequate to convince a reasonable mind that it was
complying with the permit’s flicker mitigation condition.
ii.

Light

sPower asserted that it worked with the FAA to reduce the number of turbines
required to have navigation lights from 27 to 14, and that it had developed a lighting plan
for its substation and operations building that eliminated lighting at night while not in use.
sPower also represented that it used downward-facing lighting whenever possible.
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NMA argues that sPower’s representations are just “bald assertions in self-serving
letters.” (NMA’s Br. at 33.) It also claims that a sentence in one of Wasatch Wind’s
application papers belies sPower’s contention that it negotiated fewer navigation lights.
According to NMA, Wasatch Wind had represented that the FAA “typically requires only
that turbines on the perimeter be lit.” (NMA’s Br. at 32.)
Contrary to NMA’s characterization, Wasatch Wind noted that the FAA typically
requires “the turbines on at least the perimeter” to be lit. (NMA2R.1062.) Wasatch Wind’s
assessment therefore sets lighting the perimeter as a minimum, whereas NMA erroneously
casts the same language as setting a ceiling.
NMA’s complaints about sPower’s representations are really only that—objections
that sPower didn’t provide documentation corroborating its representation. But where
NMA doesn’t point to contradictory evidence, sPower’s statements are more than a
scintilla, even if less than the weight of the evidence, and that is sufficient to support the
County’s determination under the substantial evidence test.
iii.

Sound

There are no industry standards applicable to sound impacts on undeveloped
agricultural property like that of the NMA members. sPower has, nonetheless, made efforts
to decrease sound impact. Instead of using Siemens and Vestas turbines as originally
planned, it used new, quieter GE turbines. sPower conducted sound studies to confirm that
its rearrangement of turbines and use of the GE turbines had reduced the sound impact by
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a decibel, meeting the industry standard for existing residences and businesses near the
project. The study indicated that one NMA member’s property might experience noise
higher than 47 decibels, the accepted limit for residential property.
NMA argues that the GE turbines are actually noisier, and, regardless, sPower’s
study doesn’t specify what turbines it’s analyzing. It also argues that sPower’s
rearrangement brought turbines closer to its properties that it believes had to have worsened
the sound impacts. (NMA’s Br. at 30-31.) But these arguments are inaccurate and
speculative.
The citation NMA provides for its assertion that the GE turbines are actually noisier
is the updated sound study, which states that the new turbines are indeed quieter.
(NMA2R.0730.) Although the update doesn’t specify that it’s analyzing the new GE
turbines, that information appears elsewhere in the record. Finally, NMA’s speculation that
moving turbines closer to its members’ properties increased sound impact, even if true,
isn’t enough to render the County’s assessment unreasonable when NMA provides no
evidence of an industry standard controlling sound impacts on vacant agricultural land.
III.

NMA lacked a due process right to participate in the planning commission’s
revocation hearing on sPower’s permit. (responding to Point II of NMA’s brief,
pages 34-40)
NMA asserts that it had a due process right to participate (present evidence and

argument and object) in the planning commission’s revocation hearing on sPower’s permit
based on what is essentially a claimed property right in the County’s enforcement of the
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permit’s conditions. The County therefore allegedly violated that right when it denied
NMA participation in the hearing. But there is no property right in the enforcement of
zoning laws against others that would give rise to the due process right NMA claims.
“‘To state a cognizable substantive [or procedural] due process claim, [plaintiffs]
must first allege sufficient facts to show a property or liberty interest warranting due
process protection.’” Petersen v. Riverton City, 2010 UT 58, ¶ 21, 243 P.3d 1261 (quoting
Patterson v. Am. Fork City, 2003 UT 7, ¶ 23, 67 P.3d 466) (alterations original) (quotation
marks and citations omitted). “The United States Supreme Court has defined a property
interest ‘as a legitimate claim of entitlement to some benefit.’” Id. (quoting Hyde Park Co.
v. Santa Fe City Council, 226 F.3d 1207, 1210 (10th Cir. 2000)) (quotation marks and
citations omitted). “‘An abstract need for, or unilateral expectation of, a benefit does not
constitute property.’” Id., ¶ 22 (quoting Hyde Park, 226 F.3d at 1210) (alteration and
quotation marks omitted). “Rather, a property interest exists only where ‘existing rules and
understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law . . . secure certain
benefits and [ ] support claims of entitlement to those benefits.’” Id. (alterations original).
The County doesn’t dispute that it didn’t allow NMA to participate in the revocation
hearing. The County’s disagreement with NMA is rather over a legal question: whether an
adjacent property owner has a due process right to participate in its neighbor’s permit
revocation hearing, particularly where the hearing arises from the adjacent property
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owner’s complaint that its neighbor’s failure to meet the permit’s conditions is causing the
adjacent property harm.
NMA identifies no authority supporting its proposition that an adjacent property
owner has a due process right to be heard at its neighbor’s permit revocation hearing. It
cites to United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property (“James Daniel”) for the “right
to the unrestricted use and enjoyment” of its property, 510 U.S. 43, 54 (1993), but the
opinion offers NMA little, if any, support.
James Daniel is a civil forfeiture case involving a physical taking, so its relevancy
here is limited to establishing that a deprivation of a possessory interest in property might
qualify for due process protection. But NMA fails to explain how its members have been
deprived of any use or enjoyment of their properties. Even assuming that NMA is correct
and the County wasn’t properly enforcing the conditions it placed on sPower’s permit, the
NMA members’ properties’ agricultural zoning remained unchanged, and no uses were
curtailed or enjoyment limited.
Even if sPower were violating the permit’s conditions resulting in harm to the NMA
members’ rights of use and enjoyment, sPower would be causing that harm, not the County.
NMA asserts that, ultimately, the County is responsible for the alleged harm to the NMA
members’ property rights because it has failed to enforce the permit’s conditions against
sPower. NMA’s due process argument against the County therefore essentially asserts a
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protectable property interest in the County’s enforcement of the permit’s conditions against
sPower. But NMA doesn’t have that right for at least two reasons.
First, the County’s land use laws are enacted “to provide for the health, safety, and
welfare” of its citizens generally. Utah Code § 17-27a-102(1)(a). These generally
applicable laws do not create the private entitlements distinguishable from generalized
public benefits that give rise to protectable property interests subject to due process
protections. NMA therefore errs by asserting a protectable property interest in enforcing
the County’s land use laws against sPower because those laws haven’t created a
personalized entitlement. See Gagliardi v. Village of Pawling, 18 F.3d 188, 191 (2d Cir.
1994) (noting the federal district court’s dismissal of due process claims upon finding that
the plaintiffs had no protectable property right in zoning laws “enacted for the general
health and welfare of the entire public”).
Next, even if a protectable property interest in the County’s enforcement of its laws
were possible, it wouldn’t exist here because the County’s decision whether to bring an
enforcement action against sPower is discretionary.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit addressed this unusual question
(typically petitioners challenge a local government’s land use decisions when an
application for a permit is denied or approved) directly in Gagliardi. The plaintiffs owned
property zoned residential next to industrially-zoned property occupied by a corporation
that the plaintiffs contended was violating local zoning regulations, including generating
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excessive noise, storing hazardous materials, and failing to provide adequate drainage. The
plaintiffs sued the corporation, the local village government, and various village officials,
bringing several claims, including one against the village under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for
allegedly violating the plaintiffs’ procedural and substantive due process rights by not
enforcing zoning regulations against the corporation. The Second Circuit affirmed the due
process claims’ dismissal.
The court explained that, because a protectable property interest arises from a
legitimate claim of entitlement to a benefit, “[w]here a local regulator has discretion with
regard to the benefit at issue, there normally is no entitlement to that benefit. An entitlement
to a benefit arises only when the discretion of the issuing agency is so narrowly
circumscribed as to virtually assure conferral of the benefit.” Gagliardi, 18 F.3d at 192
(cleaned up). The court also observed that “[g]overnment officials . . . generally are given
broad discretion in their decisions whether to undertake enforcement actions.” Id. Upon its
review of the applicable ordinances, the court found that the village officials had discretion
in the enforcement of the zoning regulations and affirmed the due process claims’ dismissal
for lack of a protectable property interest. Id. at 192-93. See also Kuhl v. Halquist Farms,
Inc., case no. 02-1156 (MJD/RLE), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11251 at *13-*17 (D. Minn.
June 26, 2003) (finding no due process right in enforcing zoning laws against neighbor’s
manure basin).
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Utah recognizes this discretion in prosecutors’ analogous determinations whether
and what charges to pursue in criminal matters. See, e.g., State v. Mohi, 901 P.2d 991, 1011
(Utah 1995) (Russon, J., dissenting) (“[T]he determination of the appropriate charge with
its applicable sanctions is the sort of matter that has traditionally been left to the
prosecutor’s discretion.”).
The County’s revocation ordinance doesn’t limit this traditional discretion. It
describes a conditional use permit as “revocable,” rather than setting forth specific
circumstances under which revocation would be mandatory:
A conditional use permit shall be revocable by the Planning Commission at
any time due to failure of the permittee to observe any condition specified or
failure to observe other requirements of this Ordinance in regard to the
maintenance and improvements or conduct of the use or business as
approved.
SJCZO § 6-10. After a hearing where the permittee may be heard, call witnesses, and
present evidence, “the Planning Commission shall determine whether the permit should be
revoked.” Id. The decision whether to revoke is left to the planning commission’s
discretion.
Because the zoning ordinance gives the planning commission broad discretion when
deciding whether to revoke a conditional use permit, NMA lacked any entitlement to that
outcome, and therefore had no protectable property interest on which to base its due process
claims.
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Recognizing a protectable property interest in the County’s enforcement of its
ordinances likely would require Utah’s local governments to convene hearings whenever
they received a third-party complaint alleging that a permittee wasn’t complying with its
permit’s conditions. Rather than deciding in their discretion whether a complaint merited
convening a revocation hearing, local officials would have to at least hold a hearing on the
third party’s complaint. Because the third party would have a protectable property interest
in enforcement, the local officials likely would need to provide it with notice and an
opportunity to present evidence and argument before deciding whether to proceed against
the permittee or not (and thereby extinguishing what the third party believes is a legitimate
property right in having the permit’s conditions enforced). A local government could try
alternatively to streamline that process by almost always convening a revocation hearing
when it received a complaint, exposing the permittee to the real risk of abuse by allowing
competitors and any other adverse third party to trigger multiple expensive reviews where
it must defend its supposedly vested rights. The burden on local governments would likely
correspondingly increase, not only due to increased administrative costs of holding so
many hearings, but it would also expose more opportunities to create liability by pitting
them between the permittee’s vested rights and the complainant’s enforcement rights. This
cannot be the law, and NMA presents no authority that it is.
Finally, NMA’s attempt to leverage the district court’s conclusion in NMA 1 that
NMA’s due process rights were violated when it wasn’t provided notice or an opportunity
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to be heard by the county commission on sPower’s request for reconsideration into a
general finding of due process rights that entitled it to be heard at sPower’s revocation
hearing before the planning commission fails. The due process right recognized by the
district court arises from NMA’s entitlement to appeal the planning commission’s decision
not to revoke sPower’s permit to the county commission under the County’s zoning
ordinance. Ordinance § 2-2(2) broadly allows “any person affected by a land use
authority’s decision” to appeal that decision to the county appeal authority (in contrast to
Utah Code § 17-27a-801(2)(a)’s authorization for anyone “adversely affected” to petition
for review). SJCZO § 2-2(2) (NMA2R.0549-50). That ordinance does not, however, affect
the County’s discretionary enforcement or create a property interest therein. Thus, to the
extent NMA suggests that, since the district court found that it had a due process right to
be heard on sPower’s reconsideration request, it also had a due process right to be heard at
sPower’s revocation hearing, it is incorrect.
CONCLUSION
The County requests that the Court affirm the district court’s ruling on NMA’s and
the County’s cross-motions for summary judgment. NMA’s argument that the county
commission lacked authority to reconsider its written decision on NMA’s appeal fails
because the county commission enjoyed inherent authority to do so. NMA’s contention
that the district court’s decision is deficient because the record wasn’t sufficient for review
under McElhaney is erroneous. The standard’s application here is different than in
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McElhaney, and was fulfilled by the county commission’s written decision. Finally,
NMA’s claim that the County’s refusal to allow it to participate in the planning
commission’s revocation hearing on sPower’s permit violated its due process rights fails
because NMA has no due process right in the County’s discretionary enforcement of the
permit’s conditions.
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Intervening Respondents.
The Court, having considered cross-motions for summary judgment filed by
petitioner Northern Monticello Alliance, LLC (“NMA”) and respondents the San Juan
County Commission and San Juan County (collectively, “County”) and the briefing
thereon, and having heard oral argument, and reviewed the proposed order submitted
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by the County, the objection filed by NMA, and the County’s response thereto, now
decides the motions as follows.
This petition arises from a decision of the San Juan County Commission, acting
in its capacity as the county appeal authority under Utah Code § 17-27a-701, made on
remand from this Court’s order in a prior petition for review between these parties and
heard by this Court, case no. 160700001 (“NMA I”). That petition arose after the county
commission affirmed the county planning commission’s decision not to revoke a
conditional use permit for a wind power facility held by Sustainable Power Group, LLC
and Latigo Wind Park, LLC (collectively, “sPower”). The county commission did so via
an amended decision after initially reversing the planning commission’s decision upon
finding that sPower had presented no evidence beyond bare statements that it was
complying with the permit’s conditions requiring it to mitigate the project’s flicker, light,
and sound impacts. In a letter dated December 3, 2015 seeking the county commission’s
reconsideration, sPower contended that the county commission’s initial decision was
mistaken, and that it had presented extensive evidence showing its compliance. The
county commission issued its amended decision as a result. But sPower did not send
NMA a copy of its letter, and the county commission reconsidered its decision without
involving NMA.
In NMA I, this Court held that the county commission’s failure to involve NMA in
its reconsideration violated NMA’s due process rights, but otherwise held that the
county commission’s amended decision was supported by substantial evidence and
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legal. This Court vacated the county commission’s amended decision and remanded this
matter back to the county commission “for proceedings consistent with the Court’s
Decision.” (NMA I, Ruling Am. J. (Nov. 14, 2016).)
On remand, the county commission took briefs from both sPower and NMA on
sPower’s request for reconsideration and held a hearing where attorneys for both parties
presented arguments. The county commission limited the parties to the evidence
already in the record, reasoning that it was considering sPower’s contention that,
contrary to the county commission’s initial decision, the record contained more than its
representative’s bare statements that it was complying with the permit’s conditions. The
county commission then issued a new amended decision affirming the planning
commission. This petition for review followed, where NMA again argues that the county
commission’s decision is illegal and unsupported by substantial evidence.
While the law of the case doctrine may not strictly apply to this situation, the
Court nonetheless may, as it has considered and decided these matters on effectively the
same record in NMA I once before, determine that it need not reconsider them and
instead rely on its prior determination that, but for the due process violation, the county
commission’s decision was not illegal and was supported by substantial evidence.
In NMA I, the Court explained that, “[w]hile the County’s decision to reverse its
earlier decision was based on evidence properly before it, NMA did not have the same
opportunity to argue its side of the case with regard to that evidence or to present its
own evidence.” (NMA I, Mem. Dec. on Aug. 30, 2016 Hr’g at 8 (Sept. 9, 2016).) The
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Court expected that on remand the county commission would remedy its denial of due
process to NMA by giving it a chance to respond to sPower’s December 3, 2015 letter,
which was essentially sPower’s motion to reconsider, and to evaluate those arguments
and consider any evidence in the record that NMA would want to call to the county
commission’s attention in evaluating whether it should have reconsidered its decision.
(The Court did not mean for the county commission to take evidence if it hadn’t taken
evidence in the first place.) The Court hasn’t read anything in the memoranda or heard
anything at argument that persuades it that the county commission didn’t do what the
Court expected it to do.
The Court therefore DENIES NMA’s motion for summary judgment and
GRANTS the County’s cross-motion for summary judgment. This order fully resolves all
claims at issue in this matter and serves as the Court’s FINAL JUDGMENT.
-----------------------------------------END OF ORDER------------------------------------------Ordered by the Court as indicated
by the date and seal at the top of the first page.
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Kuhl v. Halquist Farms, Inc.
United States District Court for the District of Minnesota
June 26, 2003, Decided
Civil File No. 02-1156 (MJD/RLE)
Reporter
2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11251 *; 2003 WL 21517361

James W. Kuhl and Marilynn E. Kuhl, Plaintiffs, v. Halquist Farms, Inc.; Florence Halquist; William Floyd Halquist;
County of Carver, Minnesota; and Michael Lein, an Environmental Services Director of Carver County, Defendants.
Disposition: [*1] Defendant Carver County and Michael Lein's Motion for Summary Judgment granted in part.
Counts One through Five and Count Eight of Complaint dismissed without prejudice. Defendant Halquist Farms,
Inc., Florence Halquist and William Halquist's Motion for Summary Judgment denied as moot.

Core Terms
Farms, Manure, Basin, feedlot, property interest, Ordinance, summary judgment, conditional use permit, testing,
odors, certificate of compliance, air, entitlement, emissions, rights, protected property interest, public hearing, due
process, deprivation, regulation, statutes, variance, asserts, Counts, notice, barn

Case Summary
Procedural Posture
Plaintiff landowners sued defendant farm, farm owners, Carver County, and a county official, alleging a deprivation
of their constitutional rights and a taking as a result of the county's alleged failure to enforce state and local laws
surrounding the regulation of the farm's manure basin and alleging state law claims against the farm and farm
owners. The farm, farm owners, county, and county official moved for summary judgment.
Overview
The county and county official were entitled to summary judgment on the landowners' substantive and procedural
due process claims because the state and county laws regulating animal manure waste (Minn. Stat. § 116.07, subd.
1, Minn. R. 7020.0200, and the Carver County, Minnesota, Feedlot Management Ordinance) did not give the
landowners a particular benefit that could have been construed as a liberty or property interest. In addition, nothing
in the statutes, rules, or ordinance gave the landowners a legitimate claim of entitlement based upon limited
decision-making discretion. Moreover, adjacent landowners in Minnesota did not have a property interest in the
enforcement of zoning regulations and laws because the notice and hearing procedures were not sufficient to entitle
the landowners to the benefit of a certificate of compliance, variance, or conditional use permit. The court declined
to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims against the farm and farm owners given the
significant interests in comity concerning that area of state and county law.
Outcome
The county and county official were granted summary judgment on the substantive and procedural due process
claims. The remaining state law claims against the farm and farm owners were dismissed without prejudice.
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] Entitlement as Matter of Law, Appropriateness

Summary judgment is proper if there are no disputed issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The court must view the evidence and the inferences which may
be reasonably drawn from the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. However, summary
judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as a whole, which are designed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 1.
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] Summary Judgment, Opposing Materials

The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact
and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The nonmoving party must demonstrate the existence of
specific facts in the record which create a genuine issue for trial. A party opposing a properly supported motion for
summary judgment may not rest upon mere allegations or denials, but must set forth specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial.

Civil Rights Law > Protection of Rights > Section 1983 Actions > Scope
Civil Rights Law > Protection of Rights > Section 1983 Actions > General Overview
HN3[

] Protection of Rights, Section 1983 Actions

The language of 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983 is not in itself a source of substantive rights, but instead is a vehicle for
asserting federal rights conferred elsewhere. Thus, a plaintiff asserting claims under § 1983 must identify a specific
constitutional right allegedly deprived under color of state law.
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HN4[

] Elements, Protected Rights

In analyzing a claim that the deprivation of property violates either procedural or substantive due process rights, a
court must first consider whether the claimant has a protected property interest to which the Fourteenth
Amendment's due process protection applies. Protected property interests are created by state law, but federal law
determines whether property interests rise to the level of constitutionally protected property interests. State law can
create a property interest by explicitly creating a property right, by establishing statutory or regulatory measures that
impose substantive limitations on the exercise of official discretion, or by understandings between the state and the
other party. An interest is considered a protected property interest for the purposes of 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983 when the
plaintiff has a legitimate claim to entitlement as opposed to a mere subjective expectancy.
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HN5[

] Elements, Protected Rights

Under Minn. Statutes § 116.07, the powers and duties of the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency are prescribed.
Minn. Stat. § 116.07, subd. 1. Minn. R. ch. 7020 governs the storage, transportation, disposal and utilization of
animal manure and process wastewaters and sets requirements for application for and issuance of permits for
construction and operation of animal manure management and disposal or utilization systems for the protection of
the environment. Minn. R. 7020.0200. The Carver County Feedlot Management Ordinance regulates the location,
development, operation, and expansion of feedlots. While these laws operate to set standards for issuing permits
and regulating land-use, they do not give individuals a particular benefit that could be construed as a property
interest for the purposes of a 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983 claim.

Business & Corporate Compliance > ... > Real Property Law > Zoning > Constitutional Limits
Real Property Law > Encumbrances > Adjoining Landowners > General Overview
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Page 3 of 10

2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11251, *1
Constitutional Law > Substantive Due Process > General Overview
Constitutional Law > Substantive Due Process > Scope
Business & Corporate Compliance > ... > Environmental Law > Land Use & Zoning > Agriculture & Farmland
Environmental Law > Land Use & Zoning > Constitutional Limits
Real Property Law > Zoning > General Overview
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HN6[

] Zoning, Constitutional Limits

Adjacent property owners in Minnesota do not have a property interest in the enforcement of zoning regulations and
laws. The Minnesota Court of Appeals reasons that state law and some city ordinances recognize that certain
adjacent property owners can sue to require enforcement of the zoning laws. It does not necessarily follow,
however, that this right confers a protected property interest for the purposes of the Substantive Due Process
Clause and 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983. Minnesota law has recognized that zoning ordinances do not create a property
interest in adjacent landowners.
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Constitutional Law > ... > Fundamental Rights > Procedural Due Process > Scope of Protection
HN7[

] Constitutional Law, Substantive Due Process

Notice and public hearing processes alone are insufficient to create a constitutionally protected property right to
trigger a substantive or procedural due process violation. Procedures alone do not create a substantive property
right. A law's notice and hearing provisions alone do not entitle property owners to the benefit of a denial of a
certificate of compliance, variance, or conditional use permit. The procedures proffered by statutes and ordinance
do not establish a property interest where the statute or ordinance does not provide substantive rules of entitlement.

Constitutional Law > Substantive Due Process > Scope
Environmental Law > Land Use & Zoning > Conditional Use Permits & Variances
HN8[

] Constitutional Law, Substantive Due Process

A decision to grant or deny a variance or conditional use permit remains vested in the decision-makers. While a
notice and hearing itself may sway the decision, it does not in fact place a significant substantive restriction on the
decision-makers' discretion sufficient to create an entitlement to a benefit for purposes of the Substantive Due
Process Clause.
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Governments > Courts > Judicial Comity
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Civil Procedure > ... > Subject Matter Jurisdiction > Supplemental Jurisdiction > General Overview
HN9[

] Jurisdiction, Jurisdictional Sources

Under 28 U.S.C.S. § 1367(a), a federal court may assert supplemental jurisdiction over state claims when a federal
claim is properly before the court. However, when all federal claims have been dismissed, the court has discretion
to dismiss the remaining state claims. 28 U.S.C.S. § 1367(c)(3). Section 1367(c)(3) specifically states that the
district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim if the district court has dismissed all
claims over which it has original jurisdiction. The district court's discretion as to whether to exercise jurisdiction over
the remaining claims should be informed by principles of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.
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Defendants Halquist Farms Inc. and Florence and William Floyd Halquist.
Paul D. Reuvers, Esq., and Jason J. Kuboushek, Esq., Iverson Reuvers, Bloomington, Minnesota, counsel for
Defendants County of Carver and Michael Lein.
Judges: DONOVAN W. FRANK, Judge of United States District Court.
Opinion by: DONOVAN W. FRANK

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Introduction
The above-entitled matter is before the undersigned United States District Judge pursuant to Defendants' motions
for summary judgment. Defendants Carver County and Michael Lein (collectively, the "Carver County Defendants")
move for summary judgment on Count Six, Substantive [*2] Due Process; Count Seven, Procedural Due Process;
and Count Eight, Inverse Condemnation, of the Complaint. Defendants Halquist Farms, Inc., Florence Halquist, and
William Floyd Halquist (collectively, "Halquist Farms") move for summary judgment on four counts of the Complaint:
Count One, Nuisance; Count Two, Trespass; Count Three, MERA; and Count Four, Negligence. For the reasons
set forth below, Carver County and Michael Lein's motion is granted on Counts Six and Seven of the Complaint.
The remaining claims are dismissed without prejudice.

Background
This case arises out of a dispute over the odors emanating from a 5-million gallon liquid manure basin (the "Manure
Basin") at a dairy feedlot operation located in Carver County, Minnesota. The Manure Basin at issue is located on
the Halquist Farms' feedlot in Belle Plaine, Minnesota. Halquist Farms is a family dairy corporation and feedlot
operation owned by members of the Florence and William Halquist family. The farm has been in the Halquist family
for more than 100 years. Halquist Farms is neighbored by James and Marilyn Kuhl's hog farm. The Kuhls have
lived at their farm since 1964. The Halquist Farms' Manure Basin is located [*3] 350 feet from the Kuhls' house.
Simply put, the Kuhls do not like how the Manure Basin smells. According to the Kuhls, the Manure Basin emits
strong and offensive odors and air emissions of a combination of chemicals. The Kuhls assert that the odors
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emanating from the manure basin have substantially interfered with the use and enjoyment of their property and,
further, that the manure smells have diminished their property value. Specifically, the Kuhls contend that the odors
force them out of their sleep at night, that they must search for a place to sleep in their home where the smells are
not as strong, and that people will not visit them at their home because of these odors and air emissions. As a
result, the Kuhls assert claims of nuisance, trespass, and violations of the Minnesota Environmental Rights Act
("MERA") against Halquist Farms. In addition, the Kuhls assert that the Carver County Defendants' have failed to
enforce state and local laws surrounding the regulation of the Manure Basin, thus resulting in a deprivation of their
constitutional rights and a taking of their property.
The Manure Basin was built in December 1992 as part of an expansion project on Halquist Farms [*4] that
included a freestall dairy barn and a milking parlor. In August 1992, Florence Halquist, on behalf of Halquist Farms,
submitted an application to Carver County for this expansion. (See Lein Aff., Ex. A.) Neither her application nor the
1992 certificate of compliance issued by the County specifically mentioned the Manure Basin.
In 1994, the Kuhls complained to Carver County regarding the location of the Manure Basin and the odors
stemming from it. On May 19, 1994, Michael Lein, the Carver County Environmental Services Director, sent a letter
to Halquist Farms stating that the 1992 certificate of compliance "included an approval to construct a manure
lagoon."
On December 21, 1995, Patrick Mader ("Mader") of the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency ("MPCA") wrote to
Halquist Farms, notifying them that in order for the manure basin to meet MPCA design specifications, Halquist
Farms would need to obtain permeability tests on the Manure Basin walls. Later, the MPCA obtained an estimate to
conduct thin wall permeability tests on the Manure Basin. Mader ultimately requested four tests, one on each wall of
the Manure Basin. The Kuhls assert that these tests were never conducted.
[*5] In June 1996, Carver County appropriated $ 4,000 for soil testing for the Manure Basin and retained B.A.
Liesch Associates to conduct the testing. In November 1996, B.A. Liesch Associates submitted its soil investigation
report to Carver County. Lein forwarded the soil investigation report to Ron Leaf of the MPCA. On December 31,
1996, Leaf issued a letter to Halquist Farms stating that they could continue to use the Manure Basin. The Kuhls
contend that this "1996 certification" was granted in violation of Minn. R. Chapter 7020 and Minn. Stat. § 116.07,
subd. 5, which requires a variance and a public hearing. In addition, the Kuhls assert that Lein failed to
acknowledge to the MPCA that the permeability testing, as required by the MPCA, had not been conducted.
In 1997, the Halquists proposed to build a heifer barn with additional animal units. The Kuhls contend that there was
no conditional use permit, notice, or hearing regarding these changes to the feedlot operation. However, the County
issued a Conditional Use Permit to Halquist Farms, pursuant to the newly adopted Carver County Feedlot
Ordinance, in July 1997. 1 Further, the County asserts that a public hearing was held on [*6] July 15, 1997, and the
CUP was granted after the Carver County Board of Commissioners received input from James Kuhl.
In September 1998, the MPCA notified Halquist Farms that the Manure Basin had the potential to exceed the state
ambient air quality standard for hydrogen sulfide and that the MPCA intended to work with Halquist Farms to
address this issue. After the MPCA confirmed that emissions might exceed Minnesota state air quality standards,
the MPCA and Halquist Farms entered into a Memorandum of Understanding that included measures for reducing
Halquist Farms' hydrogen sulfide emissions. The Kuhls maintain that the MPCA and Halquist Farms have not
abided by this Memorandum of Understanding.
In addition to their assertions against the Carver County Defendants regarding the regulation of the Manure Basin,
the Kuhls raise several other issues. First, the Kuhls claim that the Carver County Defendants bypassed state and
county legislation [*7] in issuing certificates of compliance in 1998 and 2000 for the Halquist family's Market
Avenue feedlot operation, located on a different property. The Kuhls contend that the Market Avenue feedlot and
the Halquist Farms feedlot are joint operations and that cattle are moved between the two properties. Second, the
Kuhls maintain that Halquist Farms was housing more calves than permitted by its certificate of compliance. The
1 The

Carver County Feedlot Ordinance was adopted on June 23, 1996.

Page 6 of 10

2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11251, *7
Kuhls base this assertion on newspaper reports indicating that a fire that destroyed a dairy barn on the Halquist
Farms feedlot in 2000 resulted in the loss of 108 calves, when only 70 calves were permitted under Halquist Farms'
1997 certificate of compliance. Finally, the Kuhls assert that Halquist Farms did not have a permit, certificate of
compliance, or conditional use permit for a new free-stall heifer barn installed at the feedlot in 2001.
The Kuhls contend that the Manure Basin and feedlot have operated in violation of state and county laws since the
construction of the Manure Basin in 1992. As a result, they assert a federal cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
for what they allege to be the Carver County Defendants' violation of [*8] their substantive and procedural due
process rights. The Kuhls also allege multiple state claims against Halquist Farms: a nuisance action for creating
and allowing air emissions and water contamination to pollute their property; a trespass claim for noxious air and
water emissions that enter their property; a MERA claim pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 116B.01 for pollution of air, water,
and other natural resources; and a negligence action for the negligent design, construction and operation of the
feedlot and manure basin. Finally, the Kuhls allege an assault claim related to actions by William Floyd Halquist.
The Carver County Defendants admit that in 1994 they began receiving complaints from neighbors, including the
Kuhls, regarding odors from the Halquist Farms feedlot. The County maintains, however, that there were no laws
restricting the placement of the manure basin when the manure basin was built. The County further asserts that the
conditional use permit issued for the construction of a heifer barn at the Halquist Farms property complied with the
procedures outlined in the Carver County Feedlot Management Ordinance, including notice and a public hearing on
the matter. The County [*9] contends that James Kuhl's concerns were heard during that public hearing. Finally,
the County asserts that the MPCA has conducted odor monitoring and testing of the manure basin and has noted
no violations of hydrogen sulfide standards except during the exempted pump-out times.

Discussion

1. Standard of Review
HN1[ ] Summary judgment is proper if there are no disputed issues of material fact and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The court must view the evidence and the inferences
which may be reasonably drawn from the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Enterprise
Bank v. Magna Bank of Missouri, 92 F.3d 743, 747 (8th Cir. 1996). However, as the Supreme Court has stated,
"summary judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an
integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed 'to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action.'" Fed. R. Civ. P. 1; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265, 106
S. Ct. 2548 (1986).
HN2[ ] The moving party bears the burden of showing [*10] that there is no genuine issue of material fact and
that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Enterprise Bank, 92 F.3d at 747. The nonmoving party must
demonstrate the existence of specific facts in the record which create a genuine issue for trial. Krenik v. County of
Le Sueur, 47 F.3d 953, 957 (8th Cir. 1995). A party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment
may not rest upon mere allegations or denials, but must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine
issue for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202, 106 S. Ct. 2505 (1986); Krenik,
47 F.3d at 957.
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1983
The parties agree that the applicable statute of limitations period for the Kuhls' section 1983 claims is six years,
pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subdivision 1(5). See Berg v. Groschen, 437 N.W.2d 75, 77 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989).
The Kuhls filed their Complaint on April 23, 2002. Thus, the section 1983 claim may only encompass the Carver
County Defendants' actions alleged to have occurred after April 23, 1996.
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HN3[ ] Section [*11] 1983 is not in itself a source of substantive rights, but instead is a vehicle for asserting
federal rights conferred elsewhere. Adewale v. Whalen, 21 F. Supp. 2d 1006, 1014 (D. Minn. 1998), citing Bahr v.
County of Martin, 771 F. Supp. 970, 974 (D. Minn. 1991). Thus, a plaintiff asserting claims under Section 1983 must
identify a specific constitutional right allegedly deprived under color of state law. Adewale, 21 F. Supp.2d at 1014,
citing Bahr, 771 F. Supp. at 974. Here, in Counts Six and Seven of their Complaint, the Kuhls assert that the Carver
County Defendants deprived them of their rights to substantive and procedural due process in violation of section
1983.
HN4[ ] "In analyzing a claim that the deprivation of property violates either procedural or substantive due process
rights, a court must first consider whether the claimant has a protected property interest to which the Fourteenth
Amendment's due process protection applies." Ellis v. City of Yankton, S.D., 69 F.3d 915, 917 (8th Cir. 1995), citing
Dover Elevator Co. v. Arkansas State Univ., 64 F.3d 442, 445-46 (8th Cir. 1995). [*12] Protected property interests
are created by state law, but federal law determines whether property interests rise to the level of constitutionally
protected property interests.Id., citing Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 9, 56 L. Ed. 2d 30, 98
S. Ct. 1554 (1978). State law can create a property interest by explicitly creating a property right, by "establishing
statutory or regulatory measures that impose substantive limitations on the exercise of official discretion," or by
"understandings between the state and the other party." Movers Warehouse, Inc. v. City of Little Canada, 71 F.3d
716, 719 (8th Cir. 1995), quoting Craft v. Wipf, 836 F.2d 412, 416-17 (8th Cir. 1987). An interest is considered a
protected property interest for the purposes of section 1983 when the plaintiff has a "legitimate claim to entitlement"
as opposed to a "mere subjective expectancy." Batra v. Board of Regents of University of Nebraska, 79 F.3d 717,
720 (8th Cir. 1996), quoting Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577, 33 L. Ed. 2d 548, 92 S.
Ct. 2701 (1972).
Here, the Kuhls [*13] "claim a liberty or property interest based on Minn. Stat. Sec. 116.07 and the Minnesota
Rules, Chapter 7020, which operate as significant substantive restrictions on the actions of the County." (Pl.'s Mem.
Opp. Summ. J. at 6.) The Court finds that the Kuhls have failed to demonstrate a constitutionally protected property
interest under section 1983.
First, the state and county laws at issue do not create a property interest. HN5[ ] Minnesota Statutes § 116.07
prescribes the powers and duties of the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency. See Minn. Stat. § 116.07, subd. 1.
Minnesota Rules, Chapter 7020, "governs the storage, transportation, disposal and utilization of animal manure and
process wastewaters" and sets requirements for "application for and issuance of permits for construction and
operation of animal manure management and disposal or utilization systems for the protection of the environment."
See Minn. Rules, Ch. 7020.0200. The Carver County Feedlot Management Ordinance regulates the "location,
development, operation, and expansion of feedlots." While these laws operate to set standards for issuing permits
and regulating land-use, they do not give the defendants a particular [*14] benefit that could be construed as a
property interest for the purposes of a section 1983 claim.
In addition, nothing in the statutes, rules, or ordinances cited here gives the Kuhls a legitimate claim of entitlement
based upon limited decision-making discretion. In Movers Warehouse, Inc. v. City of Little Canada, the Eighth
Circuit held that there was no property interest in the renewal of a bingo hall license where the city retained
discretion, without substantive limitations, to withhold approval of an application for license renewal. 71 F.3d 716,
718 (8th Cir. 1995). Here, too, the Carver County decision-makers have great discretion in either granting or
denying a variance or conditional use permit within the meaning of the laws. Because of this discretion, there is no
guarantee that the Plaintiffs would be absolutely "entitled" to the benefit that they seek--the denial of certification,
variance, or conditional use permit for the Manure Basin.
Moreover, HN6[ ] adjacent property owners in Minnesota do not have a property interest in the enforcement of
zoning regulations and laws. Mohler v. City of St. Louis Park, 643 N.W.2d 623, 635-36 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002); [*15]
see also Gagliardi v. Village of Pawling, 18 F.3d 188 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that there was no property interest in
enforcement of the zoning ordinance and, therefore, there was no entitlement to due process). In Mohler, the
Minnesota Court of Appeals reasoned:
State law and the city's ordinance recognize that certain adjacent property owners can sue to require
enforcement of the zoning laws. It does not necessarily follow, however, that this right confers a protected
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property interest for the purposes of the substantive due process clause and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Minnesota law
has recognized that zoning ordinances do not create a property interest in adjacent landowners
643 N.W.2d at 635 (internal citations omitted).
Here, the Minnesota statutes, rules, and the Carver County feedlot ordinance contain provisions regarding notice
and public hearing. HN7[ ] These processes alone, however, are insufficient to create a constitutionally protected
property right to trigger a substantive or procedural due process violation. Procedures alone do not create a
substantive property right. Bituminous Materials, Inc. v. Rice County, Minn., 126 F.3d 1068 (8th Cir. 1997), [*16]
citing Stow v. Cochran, 819 F.2d 864, 866 (8th Cir. 1987); see also Gagliardi v. Village of Pawling, 18 F.3d 188, 193
(2d Cir. 1994) ("The deprivation of a procedural right to be heard, however, is not actionable when there is no
protected right at stake"); Azizi v. Thornburgh, 908 F.2d 1130, 1134 (2d Cir. 1990); New Burnham Prairie Homes,
Inc. v. Village of Burnham, 910 F.2d 1474, 1479 (7th Cir. 1990). A law's notice and hearing provisions alone do not
entitle the Kuhls to the benefit of a denial of a certificate of compliance, variance, or conditional use permit. The
procedures proffered by the statutes and ordinance do not establish a property interest where the statute does not
provide substantive rules of entitlement. North Mem'l Med. Ctr. v. Gomez, 59 F.3d 735, 740 (8th Cir. 1995). HN8[ ]
The decision to grant or deny the variance or conditional use permit remains vested in the decision-makers. While
the notice and hearing itself may sway the decision, it does not in fact place a significant substantive restriction on
the decision-makers' discretion sufficient to create an entitlement to a benefit. [*17] Id.; see also Hogue v. Clinton,
791 F.2d 1318, 1324 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1008, 93 L. Ed. 2d 704, 107 S. Ct. 648 (1986).
This does not leave the Kuhls without a remedy. The Kuhls may be able to enforce the statutes, rules, and
ordinances that the Carver County Defendants have allegedly violated. See Mohler, 643 N.W.2d at 635. They may
also have valid claims in tort against Halquist Farms. However, they have not asserted a protected property interest
for the purposes of a section 1983 claim. Accordingly, summary judgment must be granted on the Kuhls'
substantive due process and procedural due process claims against Carver County and Lein. 2

[*18] 2. Supplemental Jurisdiction
Having granted summary judgment on the Kuhls' federal claims against the Carver County Defendants, the Kuhls'
state law claims for inverse condemnation, nuisance, trespass, negligence, and MERA violations remain. The
record before the Court suggests that the Plaintiffs may have cognizable causes of action as to some of these
remaining claims. See, e.g., Wendinger v. Forst Farms, Inc., 662 N.W.2d 546 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003).
HN9[ ] Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), a federal court may assert supplemental jurisdiction over state claims when a
federal claim is properly before the court. However, when all federal claims have been dismissed, the court has
discretion to dismiss the remaining state claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); Willman v. Heartland Hosp. E., 34
F.3d 605, 613 (8th Cir. 1994). Section 1367(c)(3) specifically states that the Court "may decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over a claim . . . if the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original
jurisdiction." The Court's discretion as to whether to exercise jurisdiction over these remaining claims [*19] should
be informed by principles of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity. See United Mine Workers of
America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726, 16 L. Ed. 2d 218, 86 S. Ct. 1130 (1966).
Here, although the Court regrets returning this action to state court given the time and resources the parties have
expended on a federal action, the Court recognizes that significant interests in comity exist in this important area of
state and county law. As such, the Court determines that it will not exercise its supplemental jurisdiction in this
instance and that the remaining claims stated in the Complaint are dismissed without prejudice.

2 The

Kuhls do not allege suit against Lein in his personal capacity in their Complaint. As such, the section 1983 claims are
against Lein in his official capacity and, therefore, are in effect a suit against Carver County. See Johnson v. Outboard Marine
Corp., 172 F.3d 531, 535 (1999). Regardless, the Kuhls' failure to establish a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest
would likewise warrant dismissal of the section 1983 claims against Lein in his personal capacity.
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For the reasons stated, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
1. Defendant Carver County and Michael Lein's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 12) is GRANTED on
Counts Six and Seven of the Complaint.
2. Counts One through Five and Count Eight of the Complaint (Doc. No. 1) are DISMISSED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE.
3. Defendant Halquist Farms, Inc., Florence Halquist and William Halquist's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc.
No. 20) is DENIED AS MOOT.

LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
Dated: June 26, 2003
DONOVAN [*20] W. FRANK
Judge of United States District Court

End of Document
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